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1Abstract
The main purpose of this study is to illustrate, with simple trade
theory, the relationship between competing industrial standards and
trade liberalization. We assume that there are two competing indus-
trial standards in an international context, each of which applies to a
group of diﬀerentiated products. A product can be used only in com-
bination with other products based on the same industrial standard.
We examine the impact of trade liberalization (i.e., a decline in trade
costs) on consumers’ choice of a standard. It will be shown that the
degree of indirect network eﬀects, captured with substitution between
diﬀerentiated products, plays an important role as a determinant of
the impact of trade liberalization.
21 Introduction
Two of the most important trends in the global economy in recent decades
have been (1) the dramatic increase in the role of information-intensive prod-
ucts (e.g., various types of computer software products, consumer electronic
products and IT-related services), and (2) the proliferation of trade liberal-
ization through both economic integration and preferential trade agreements.
Advances in both digital technology and trade liberalization have driven an
increase in the ﬂow of information-intensive products across countries.1
As a result of these changes, consumers face an international array of
competing product groups based on incompatible, proprietary standards.2
The choices among computer operating systems, television broadcasting stan-
dards, and DVD systems are recent examples. Also, it is widely recognized
that products based on the same industrial standard exhibit an indirect net-
work eﬀect: the utility of consumers is increasing in the variety of com-
plementary products based on a particular standard.3 Trade liberalization
1Addressing this point, the OECD (2006, ch. 2) reports that between 1996 and 2004
the annual increase in OECD countries’ exports of “software goods” was 5%, while imports
increased by an average of 6.5% per year.
2In this study we will use the term “standard,” not in the sense of government regula-
tion, but in the universal sense of the set of technical speciﬁcations that enable compati-
bility among products.
3The seminal contributions on the indirect network eﬀect are by Chou and Shy (1990)
3matters in this context because it reduces import prices and changes (usu-
ally enlarges) the available sets of complementary products, thus inﬂuencing
a society’s patterns of consumption.
In such settings, competition between a “domestic” standard and a “non-
domestic” standard is often observed. A recent example is the global com-
petition among wireless telecommunications service providers. Funk (1998)
suggests that, although most service providers are likely to dominate do-
mestically and thereby make the “home” standard dominant, ﬁrms such as
Motorola, Ericsson, and Nokia have succeeded in marketing a “non-domestic”
standard. He suggests that, while Motorola USA’s market share in Europe
is lower than in its domestic market, it still holds a signiﬁcant position in
the European (and therefore the world) market.4 Another famous example
involves incompatible color television standards. It is widely believed that
incompatible standards for color television (i.e., the NTSC system in U.S.
and Japan; the PAL system in Western Europe) contribute signiﬁcantly to
and Church and Gandal (1992). See Gandal (2001, 2002) and Farrell and Klemperer
(2007) for surveys of the relevant literature. In the international context, see Iwasa and
Kikuchi (2008) and Kikuchi (2005, 2007) for analyses of trade liberalization in the presence
of network eﬀects.
4Motorola’s share of the world market dropped from 40% in 1994 to 32% in 1995, as
use of the European GSM standard grew. Still, it is larger than Nokia’s share in the world
market (22%). See, also, Lembke (2002).
4Japanese ﬁrms’ lower market share in Western European markets relative to
that in the U.S. market.5 There seems to be a case for closer examination
and more formal modeling of increased trade in technology-related products
and ﬁercer competition among incompatible industrial standards.
In the literature on trade and competing industrial standards, the role of
government standardization policy is often emphasized. In their inﬂuential
contribution, Gandal and Shy (2001) analyzed governments’ incentives to
recognize foreign standards when there are potentially both network eﬀects
(i.e., consumption beneﬁts) and conversion costs. Their focus was on how
standardization policy aﬀects both international trade ﬂows and national
welfare.
An important question about the relationship between competing indus-
trial standards and trade liberalization remains unanswered: How does trade
liberalization aﬀect consumers’ choice between incompatible standards? The
main purpose of this study is to illustrate, with simple trade theory, this
relationship. Following Matsuyama (1992), we assume that there are two
incompatible standards, each of which applies to a group of diﬀerentiated
5Burton and Saelens (1987, p. 291) note that, while sales by Japanese ﬁrms accounted
for 43.5% of all sales in the U.S. market in 1981, Japanese ﬁrms held only a 15.2% share
of the Western European market in 1983. (Note that the Japanese televisions that are
exported to the Western Europe are based on PAL system.) Rohlfs (2001) discusses this
in terms of network eﬀects.
5products. A product can be used only in combination with other products
based on the same industrial standard. Matsuyama assumed a closed econ-
omy and paid scant attention to the role of trade liberalization. In contrast,
in this study we focus on the case of competing industrial standards in an
international context (i.e., a Home standard and a Foreign standard) and
examine the impact of trade liberalization (i.e., a decline in trade costs) on
consumers’ choice of a standard.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we present
a basic model: assuming that products are only consumed in a single (i.e.,
Home) country, we consider the competition between the Home standard and
the Foreign standard. Based on this basic model, in Section 3, the impact
of unilateral trade liberalization (i.e., a decrease in trade cost on Foreign
products in the Home country) is considered. In Section 4, we extend the
basic model to the case of two-segmented (i.e., Home and Foreign) markets,
and the impact of bilateral trade liberalization is considered. Concluding
remarks are presented in Section 5.
2 The Model
Suppose that there are two countries, Home and Foreign. In this and the
next section, we concentrate on what happens in the Home market. Both
6Home ﬁrms and Foreign ﬁrms compete in the Home market, which is deﬁned
as a line of unit length representing consumers’ set of preferences. Home
consumers are indexed by z, z ∈ [0,1], and with no loss of generality, we
normalize the total mass of Home consumers to equal 1. Each consumer is
endowed with the amount E of income to be spent on diﬀerentiated products.
Assume that there are two competing industrial standards: Home stan-
dard and Foreign standard. A variety of diﬀerentiated products can be pro-
duced based on either standard: we simply assume that Home (resp. Foreign)
ﬁrms produce products based on the Home (resp. Foreign) standard. The
two standards are not compatible with each other, hence any product can be
used only in combination with other products based on the same standard.6
Each consumer is assumed to purchase products based on only one stan-
dard (Home or Foreign). We call the two groups of diﬀerentiated products
Home standard products and Foreign standard products. The utility of con-
sumers is assumed to be increasing in the variety of complementary products
based on a particular standard. We deﬁne the utility of an individual of type
6See Matsuyama (1992) for elaboration on this point. This assumption implies that, for
one country’s producers, the cost of converting to the other standard is extremely high.
Although this assumption is restrictive, it is often argued that the existence of (high)
conversion costs aﬀects foreign ﬁrms’ behavior (Gandal and Shy, 2001).
7z by
U(z) = (1 − z)C
∗ if the individual chooses Foreign standard products, and
U(z) = zC if the individual chooses Home standard products, (1)
where C (C∗) is the quantity index of Home (Foreign) standard products.


















where n (n∗) is the number of Home (resp. Foreign) standard products and
σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between every pair of products within
the same standard.
Following Chou and Shy (1996, p. 314), we assume that the density




2, ε > −1. (3)
When ε = 0, the density function becomes uniform, representing the case
in which consumers are evenly distributed on [0,1]. Figure 1 shows that
when ε increases, the distribution shifts towards the Foreign standard. When
−1 < ε < 0, the distribution is biased in favor of the Home standard.
The importation of Foreign products is inhibited by frictional trade bar-
riers, which are modeled as iceberg trade costs: for 1 unit of Foreign product
8to reach Home, t ∈ (1,∞) units must be shipped. Thus, the price of an
imported product to Home consumers will be tp∗, where p∗ is the producer’s
price for Foreign standard products. It is important to note that this trade
cost includes all impediments to trade such as tariﬀs, but also communica-
tion diﬃculties, information barriers and cultural diﬀerences. Price indices
for each group of standard products, which indicate costs for obtaining one






















where τ ≡ t1−σ ∈ (0,1) is the measure of the freeness of trade, which in-
creases as t falls and is equal to one when trade is costless (t = 1). Note
that τn∗ represents an eﬀective number of Foreign standard products: trade
liberalization (i.e., a larger τ) can be interpreted as an increase in the number
of varieties even if n∗ remains unchanged.
Let us turn to the cost structure of diﬀerentiated products. In order
to simplify the argument, technology is assumed to be identical between
countries and characterized by increasing returns to scale, since both product
creation and market entry typically involve ﬁxed costs.7 We denote the
7As a ﬁrst step to incorporate competition between industrial standards, we will con-
centrate on the case of identical technology between standards. In order to analyze the
9constant marginal cost of production for every product by β, and the product
development cost by α.8 We assume that ﬁrms are monopolistic competitors.
Given a Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation with constant demand elasticity σ, each






Let us denote the number of consumers who purchase Home (resp, For-
eign) standard products as ρ (resp. ρ∗). Note that ρ+ρ∗ = 1. Then, assuming
that the entry and production decisions of the potential ﬁrms cannot individ-
ually aﬀect the existing ﬁrms, the equilibrium number of products produced
according to each standard becomes proportional to the total expenditure on










Combining (4), (5), (7), and (8), it can be easily shown that a consumer’s
welfare increases when more consumers purchase products with the same
standard. As more consumers choose the same standard, more ﬁrms choose
interaction of technology gap and standard competition, an extension for asymmetric tech-
nologies needs further consideration.
8For discussion on the role of market entry in the presence of ﬁxed costs, see Melitz
(2003).
10to produce based on that standard. This results in increased product diver-
siﬁcation among products with that standard.
Result 1: A consumer’s welfare is an increasing function of the number of
consumers who purchase products with the same standard.
This results in the types of “indirect network eﬀects” analyzed by both
Chou and Shy (1990) and Church and Gandal (1992): network eﬀects work
indirectly via increased diversiﬁcation of products (see Gandal, 2002).
Now let us turn to the equilibrium number of consumers who purchase
Home/Foreign standard products. We denote by ˆ z the type of the marginal









The equilibrium number of consumers who purchase Foreign standard prod-







(1 + ε)ˆ z
1 + εˆ z
=
1
1 + (1 + ε)
−1(ˆ z−1 − 1)
=
1
1 + (1 + ε)
−1(n/τn∗)
1/(σ−1). (10)
Substituting in the equilibrium number of diﬀerentiated products, we can









3 The Impact of Unilateral Trade Liberaliza-
tion
In this section we consider the impact of unilateral trade liberalization (i.e., a
reduction in t in the Home market). From (11), we can obtain the equilibrium






(1 + ε)(ρ∗)1/(σ−1) + t(1 − ρ∗)1/(σ−1). (12)
Figures 2 and 3 help to illustrate the trading equilibrium. The curves rep-
resent φ(ρ∗) functions, which show possibilities for the number of consumers
who purchase Foreign standard products that are consistent with ﬁrms’ en-
try/exit decisions. The trading equilibrium is obtained as the intersection
between these curves and the 45-degree line. From the φ(ρ∗) function we can
12obtain the following:
















0 if σ < 2,








0 if σ < 2,
∞ if σ > 2.
These results indicate that, depending on the level of elasticity between va-
rieties, σ, one of two cases will emerge. We shall discuss each case in detail.
First it is important to note the multiplicity of equilibria. Clearly from
Figures 2 and 3, there are three possible equilibria in each case: two corner
solutions [only Home (or Foreign) standard products exist] and an interior
equilibrium where both standard products coexist. If the economy initially
stays at the corner solution, a reduction in trade costs does not aﬀect the
equilibrium conﬁguration. Thus, in what follows, we concentrate on the
interior equilibirum where both standard products initially coexist.
3.1 Case 1: σ > 2
When σ > 2 holds, the indirect network eﬀects are relatively mild. The initial
trading equilibrium is obtained as point I in Figure 2. Trade liberalization
13implies an increase in the eﬀective number of Foreign varieties, τn∗, which
makes Foreign standard products more attractive: this change is shown as an
upward shift in the φ curve. Since some consumers who had been purchasing
Home standard products switch to Foreign standard products, more Foreign
ﬁrms enter into Home markets. The new equilibrium is obtained as point N
on the 45-degree line.
Proposition 1: Given that σ is greater than 2, unilateral trade liberalization
will result in a smaller number of consumers who purchase Home standard
products.
The point is that there is a cumulative process in which trade liberaliza-
tion will enhance Home consumers’ propensity to switch to the Foreign stan-
dard, and this switching will induce further product diversiﬁcation among
Foreign products. Still, since the indirect network eﬀect is mild, some con-
sumers who prefer Home standard products continue to choose those prod-
ucts.
This result is also quite important from the welfare perspective: since
trade liberalization leads some Home consumers to ‘switch’ to the Foreign
standard, the market size for Home standard products will shrink and con-
sumers who continue to choose Home standard products are made worse oﬀ
by trade liberalization.
14Proposition 2: Given that σ is greater than 2, consumers who continue to
choose Home standard products will be made worse oﬀ by trade liberalization.
It is important to note that the result that some consumers are made worse
oﬀ by trade liberalization is not new in trade literature as Heckscher-Ohlin
and other competitive models show. However, our results are derived from
imperfectly competitive setting.
























As will be made clear, ∂C/∂t > 0 > ∂C∗/∂t holds in the case of σ > 2.









































Now let us concentrate on the suﬃcient condition for (∂W
∂t ) < 0 [i.e.,
15(14)].9 The latter part of the condition (14) can be summarized as follows:
Z ˆ z
0

















ε→∞g(ε) = 0, and g
0(ε) < 0 for ε > −1.












σ − 1 − ρ∗
(1 + ε)(1 − ρ∗)
> 1
⇔ ρ
∗ε > 2 − σ + ε
⇔ ε ≤ 0, or ε > 0 and ρ
∗ > h(ε,σ) ≡





ε→+0h(ε,σ) = −∞, lim
ε→∞h(ε,σ) = 1, and
∂h(ε,σ)
∂ε
> 0 for ε > 0.
Figure 4 helps to illustrate the relationship between g(ε), h(ε,σ), and ρ∗ =
ψ(ε,t).10 The horizontal axis inidicates ε, while the vertical axis indicates the
9Suﬃcient condition for (∂W
∂t ) > 0 can be obtained similarly.










16values of each function. Figure 4 inidicates that, the smaller (resp. larger) t
(resp. ε) becomes, the higher the possibility of (∂W
∂t ) < 0 becomes.
Summarizing these conditions, we can state the impact of trade liberal-




< 0 if (i) ε > 0 and ρ
∗ > max{g(ε),h(ε,σ)} hold;
∂W
∂t
> 0 if (ii) ε > 0 and ρ
∗ < min{g(ε),h(ε,σ)} hold.
Proposition 3 [condition (i)] implies, given that the Home consumers’ prefer-
ences are biased toward Foreign standard products and initial share of For-
eign standard products is suﬃciently large, trade liberalization increases total
Home welfare. Thus, although some consumers who continue to choose Home
standard products will be made worse oﬀ by trade liberalization (Proposi-
tion 2), one can ﬁnd a redistributive scheme that makes nobody in Home
which gives the value of ρ∗ corresponding to the interior equilibrium. Note that (i)




ρ∗(1 − ρ∗)(σ − 1)









ρ∗(1 − ρ∗)(σ − 1)
t(σ − 2)
< 0.
17worse oﬀ. As space is limited, we have concentrated on the changes of total
consumers’ welfare and paid scant attention to the redistributive scheme.11
3.2 Case 2: 2 > σ > 1
When 2 > σ > 1 holds, consumers’ valuation of product varieties (i.e., the
degree of indirect network eﬀects) is relatively high. In this case, the initial
trading equilibrium is obtained as point I in Figure 3.12
An increase in the eﬀective number of Foreign varieties has more inﬂu-
ence than in the previous case (i.e., an upward shift of the φ curve). Then
consumers’ incentives to switch to Foreign standard products also become
greater, which further induces Foreign ﬁrms’ entry. Then, the demand for
Home standard products vanishes. The new equilibrium is obtained as point
N on the 45-degree line.13 From Figure 3, one can obtain the surprising
feature of the impact of trade liberalization.
11For this point, see, Kemp and Shimomura (2001) and Fujiwara (2005).
12It is important to note that point I is unstable. One interpretation of this situation is
as follows: Suppose that initially σ is suﬃciently close to (but larger than) 2 for the point
I to be stable. Then, some parameter change increases σ, which changes the slope of the
φ curve. In this situation, at least initially, the economy might stay at point I. Thus, the
results in this subsection need to be interpreted with great caution.
13Another possible equilibrium is point I0. However, since potential Foreign ﬁrms en-
ter due to improved access to the Home market and more consumers switch to Foreign
products, it seems to be natural that point N will be selected as the new equilibrium.
18Proposition 4: Given that σ is smaller than 2, unilateral trade liberalization
will eliminate purchase of the Home standard products.
A comparison between these two cases highlights the important role of
indirect network eﬀects. On one hand, if the indirect network eﬀect is mild,
trade liberalization makes the Foreign standard more attractive to some ex-
tent. Still, some consumers who prefer Home standard products continue to
choose them. On the other hand, if the indirect network eﬀects are suﬃciently
strong, trade liberalization will take Home standard products completely out
of the Home market.
4 The Impact of Bilateral Trade Liberaliza-
tion
Now consider the case markets with both a Home market segment and For-
eign market segment. To simplify the argument, we concentrate on the case
in which the degree of indirect network eﬀects is mild (i.e., σ > 2). As with
Home consumers, the total mass of Foreign consumers (indexed by ˜ z ∈ [0,1])
is normalized to 1.14 Assume that consumers’ taste in Foreign market is rep-
resented by (1). We assume that the density function of consumers’ types in
14We use “˜” to denote Foreign market values.
19the Foreign market is given by,
f(˜ z, ˜ ε) =
1 + ˜ ε
(1 + ˜ ε˜ z)
2, ˜ ε > −1. (16)
The only diﬀerence is the distribution of consumers’ tastes: since a larger
value of ε implies the distribution is biased toward the Foreign standard
product, we assume that ε < ˜ ε holds. In the Foreign market, the price of
an imported Home standard product will be ˜ tp, while that of a (domestic)
Foreign standard product will be p∗. Furthermore, we assume that each ﬁrm
must incur a ﬁxed costs to enter the market, α. Then the equilibrium number
of products produced in the Foreign market is
˜ n =








where ˜ ρ∗ is the number of consumers who purchase Foreign standard products
in the Foreign market. Following the same procedure as in the Home market,
we can obtain the equilibrium relationship for the number of consumers who
purchase Foreign standard products in the Foreign market:
˜ ρ
∗ = ˜ φ(˜ ρ
∗) ≡
(1 + ˜ ε)(˜ ρ∗)1/(σ−1)
(1 + ˜ ε)(˜ ρ∗)1/(σ−1) + ˜ t−1(1 − ˜ ρ∗)1/(σ−1). (19)
Figure 5 helps to illustrate the impact of bilateral trade liberalization. If both
t and ˜ t become smaller, φ(ρ∗) shifts upward, while ˜ φ(˜ ρ∗) shifts downward.
Thus, while the number of Home standard products becomes smaller in the
20Home market (i.e., n decreases), the number of Home standard products
becomes larger in the Foreign market (i.e., ˜ n increases). This implies that
the degree of intra-industry trade of non-domestic standard products will be
increased by bilateral trade liberalization.
Proposition 5: Bilateral trade liberalization increases the degree of intra-
industry trade of non-domestic standard products.
Let us consider this proposition more precisely. In each country, with the
increased eﬀective number of non-domestic standard products, consumers
begin to switch to those products. Such switching will provide opportunities
for the entry of non-domestic standard producers. As with Proposition 1,
the point is that there will be a cumulative process in which bilateral trade
liberalization encourages consumers to switch towards non-domestic standard
products, and those switchings will induce further intra-industry trade of
non-domestic standard products.
5 Concluding Remarks
Both trade liberalization and advances in digital technology have intensiﬁed
competition between incompatible industrial standards. In this study, we
explained the mechanism by which trade liberalization inﬂuences consumers’
21choice of a standard. In Sections 2 and 3 we examined the impact of unilateral
trade liberalization in a single (i.e., Home) market. It should be emphasized
that the degree of substitution between product varieties plays an impor-
tant role in determining the impact of trade liberalization: if the degree of
substitution is suﬃciently small (i.e., the indirect network eﬀect is relatively
large), trade liberalization will take Home standard products completely out
of the Home market. In Section 4 we examined the impact of bilateral trade
liberalization in a setting with two segmented markets. It was shown that
the intra-industry trade of non-domestic standard products will be increased
by bilateral trade liberalization.
This result (increased intra-industry trade due to trade liberalization)
is not so new.15 However, we would like to emphasize that the cumulative
process of consumers switching and ﬁrms entering works as a driving force
behind the increased intra-industry trade. This point has not appeared in
the existing literature.
The present analysis must be regarded as tentative. Hopefully, it pro-
vides a useful paradigm for considering how trade liberalization aﬀects inter-
national competition among industrial standards.
15See, for example, Helpman and Krugman (1985).
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